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Abstract
This essay explores the claim that bioethics has become a mode of biopolitics. It seeks to illuminate one
of the myriad of ways that bioethics joins other institutionalized discursive practices in the task of 
producing, organizing, and managing the bodies—of policing and controlling populations—in order to
empower larger institutional agents. The focus of this analysis is the contemporary practice of 
transnational biomedical research. The analysis is catalyzed by the enormous transformation in the
political economy of transnational research that has occurred over the past three decades and the
accompanying increase in the numbers of human bodies now subjected to research. This essay uses the
work of Michel Foucault, particularly his notion of docile bodies, to analyze these changes. Two loci from
the bioethics literature are explored—one treating research in the United States and one treating
research in developing countries. In the latter, we see a novel dynamic of the new biopolitics: the ways
in which bioethics helps to create docile political bodies that will police themselves and who will, in turn,
facilitate the production of docile human bodies for research.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1956, Dr. Saul Krugman—with the sanction of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, the 
New York State Department of Health, the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board, and others—began an
experiment at the Willowbrook State School, a state-supported institution for mentally handicapped
children.1 This experiment, which ran until 1972, sought to develop a vaccine for hepatitis, outbreaks of 
which were common at Willowbrook and similar sorts of institutions due to unsanitary conditions. In
this study, mentally handicapped children who resided in the facility were intentionally infected, either 
orally or intravenously, with live hepatitis virus and then monitored to assess the effects of gamma 
globulin in combating the disease.
At stake was almost every major issue in research ethics: that children were intentionally infected with a 
pathogen known for high risk of morbidity and mortality; that the children selected were mentally
handicapped; that the parental permission letter did not make clear that the children would be 
intentionally infected; that, due to overcrowding and long waiting lists, parents might have been unduly
influenced to enroll their children, as rooms in the experimental wing were readily available; and that
many parents who sought placement at the school generally had insufficient resources to keep their 
children at home or to place them elsewhere.
Although aware of the ethical implications of the study, Krugman countered in his defense that the
children would likely be infected with hepatitis naturally from their environment, that they would
benefit by being admitted to the experimental wing where care and conditions were better, and that
they would likely gain immunity to the virus to which they were exposed. In 1972, the year the study
ended, a class action lawsuit was brought against the State of New York for a myriad of violations
associated with the school, and Krugman became president of the American Pediatric Association.2 
In 1996, forty years after Krugman began his experiments, Pfizer—the world's largest pharmaceutical 
company—began an experiment at the Infectious Disease Hospital in strife-torn Kano, Nigeria.3 During 
an outbreak of meningitis, Pfizer researchers selected children from the long lines of ailing people
seeking care at the hospital. They treated one hundred with a new antibiotic Trovan, which had never
been tested in children, and an additional hundred with ceftriaxone, the gold standard for meningitis
treatment, but at a lower than recommended dose. At the same institution, physicians from Doctors
Without Borders were providing free treatment with chloramphenicol, a cheaper antibiotic
internationally recommended for treating bacterial meningitis. Eleven children in the Trovan study died
and an additional 181 suffered injuries including brain damage, partial paralysis, or deafness.
Again, almost every major issue in research ethics emerged: testing two experimental interventions on
children when a proven therapy was readily available; whether the parents were informed that 
intervention was experimental; whether the parents were informed that they were free to choose the 
free chloramphenicol treatment instead; whether the parents were informed that their children were 
participating in a research trial rather than simply receiving free treatment from compassionate
volunteers; whether Pfizer obtained institutional review board (IRB) approval in advance of the trial; and
whether the researchers performed accurate diagnostic tests, provided corollary care for children who
did not respond to the Trovan or ceftriaxone or provided follow-up care for children in the study
    
 
   
      
      
    
   
    
  
  
    
    
 
    
   
    
   
   
    
 
  
     
   
    
   
    
    
   
    
    
  
    
   
 
    
   
   
  
     
        
    
   
(Ballantyne, 2008, 188). Lawsuits totaling nearly $7 billion U.S. were brought by the government of 
Nigeria and thirty Nigerian families.
In its own defense, Pfizer countered that the children's parents were fully informed and that it 
proceeded with the approval of the Nigerian government.4 They further argued that the trial was, in
fact, a philanthropic effort that benefited most of the children enrolled as the number of deaths among 
those receiving Trovan was less than the overall fatality rate for the meningitis epidemic.5 On April 3,
2009, Pfizer settled one of the lawsuits brought by the Kano State of Nigeria. That same day, Pfizer 
issued a press release announcing that it had become the first pharmaceutical company to be accredited
for the protection of human rights in clinical research.6 
We have, then, two experimental protocols involving children in the context of infectious epidemics— 
one that infects them with a known pathogen and one that injects them with an experimental agent of
unknown efficacy and, as is subsequently discovered, significant toxicity.7 On their face, the cases seem
quite similar yet admit of important differences, each capturing relevant particulars of biomedical 
research in their respective eras. Less than a half-century separates them. The time frame they span
began at a time of great scandals for research, a time of numerous cries for reform. In response to these
cries came a new theory of the moral justification and parameters of medical research. “Modern” codes
were drawn up: the Declaration of Helsinki 1964, revised 1983 and 1989; The Belmont Report 1979; the 
U.S. Federal guidelines on the Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46) 1981; the U.S. Common Rule
1991; and the International Conference on Harmonization (ICH) 1990. It was the new age for research
ethics and, subsequently, bioethics.
That we live in the new age of bioethics is signaled by at least one aspect of the foregoing: the
presentation and analysis of cases in the ethics of research follow a set narrative.8 Like potboilers,
bodice rippers, murder mysteries, and Westerns, the narratives of cases in bioethics follow predictable
plot lines. Even cases that occurred before bioethics was born, like Willowbrook, are narrated through
the lenses of autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. The inciting force emerges in the 
relationship of harms to benefits and climaxes in questions of informed consent (or vice versa). In the 
denouement, justice abridged during the course of the conflict is rectified or so one hopes; in either
event, the story closes with lessons to be learned for the future.
The four principles would bring to biomedical research a greater consciousness of the humanity of the 
substrate upon which such clinical research is conducted. Yet, for all the advances the principles have
brought, one change remains below the radar of contemporary bioethics: the transformation in the
scope and scale of that very substrate and the sheer number of bodies now subject to research.
Perhaps, bioethics considers scandal rather than scope to be its primary concern. Therefore, the fact of 
increased scope of clinical research passes largely unremarked in bioethics. And in any case, how
important is this fact when compared with the sea changes in the practice of biomedical research, the
formulation of a set of principles in Belmont and of unified rules of procedures with the Federal 
Guidelines and ICH, the almost universal adoption of the IRB structure, and the conduct of so much high-
quality research? Yet, the fact remains that the numbers of human bodies subjected to transnational 
biomedical research has become, since 1956, vast and yet remains largely invisible.
To focus on the material reality of bodies, on what happens to them, and to refuse to let one's focus
shift away from those bodies is one of the unique insights brought to twentieth-century analytics by
philosopher and critical theorist Michel Foucault. By attending carefully to what was happening with the
     
   
  
   
     
   
 
      
    
    
     
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
    
   
 
       
  
    
      
   
 
   
  
    
     
 
   
    
   
   
      
     
   
     
    
bodies of the insane, the imprisoned, the sick, and more, Foucault was able to craft a new framework
for understanding the dynamics of contemporary culture, a framework he called “biopolitics.” In brief,
biopolitics is that social strategy of policing and controlling populations by “increasingly ordering all 
realms under the guise of improving the welfare of the individual and the population for the purpose of
reproducing and furthering the social order” (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982, xxvi; Finkelstein, 1990, 15).
For Foucault, a vital constituent of biopolitics from the end of the eighteenth century forward was
biomedicine.
By focusing on the material reality of bodies and what happens to them Foucault opened a window into
the biopolitical function of medicine. But medicine is not alone in this work of biopolitics. Extending
Foucault's method uncovers a more recent agent of the work of biopolitics, namely, bioethics.9 To see 
bioethics as a mode of biopolitics is to illuminate the myriad of ways that behind the rhetoric of
freedom, empowerment, and improving the welfare of the individual and the population, bioethics
functions to produce, organize, and manage the bodies of real, human persons—to police and control
populations—toward the ends of larger institutional agents such as the state or, more recently, the 
biotech industry. To see bioethics as a mode of biopolitics is to raise questions about bioethics’ role in
the political economy of biomedicine, particularly when that political economy impinges on human
bodies.
This essay, then, seeks to do just this: to explore what it might mean to see bioethics as biopolitics, as an
institutionalized set of discursive practices a major purpose of which is to manage and organize the
bodies within its purview in order to empower biomedicine and the state. This is certainly a different
narrative framework than that of the four canonical principles. Yet, this is certainly not an alternative
reading for its own sake. For, I would argue, of the two, only the framework of biopolitics can provide an
account of the enormous transformation in the political economy of biomedicine and transnational 
research that has occurred over the past three decades.
What are some of those changes? Let me briefly note a few here. Marcia Angell (2004) details how a 
series of legislative and policy changes in the early 1980s—particularly the Bayh-Dole Act and the Hatch-
Waxman Act—fueled exponential growth in biomedical research, leading it to become a multibillion
dollar global industrial enterprise with unparalleled profitability (Angell, 2004, 6–11).10 When Trovan
was developed in the mid-1990s, for example, Pfizer anticipated that it would prove to be a blockbuster 
drug, generating up to $1 billion/year in sales; it garnered $160 million in sales in 1998, its first year on
the market (Lewin, 2001). No such financial windfall could have been anticipated in the Willowbrook
case.
Along with these new economic realities have come radical shifts in geography and agency. Behind
Krugman stood U.S. governmental agencies; behind Trovan stood a transnational pharmaceutical
company.11 By 2001, pharmaceutical research enrolled some 2.3 million subjects in just the United
States, in an estimated 80,000 clinical trials, a dramatic increase over the number of people involved in
clinical trials in the 1970s (Angell, 2004, 29). And, as the Trovan case makes clear, additional policy
changes in the early 1990s opened up new markets in human subjects, shifting the location of
biomedical research from the United States and Europe toward developing contexts. Consequently, the 
number of international human subjects involved in clinical trials grew from 4,000 in 1995 to 400,000 in
1999 just for new drug applications (Petryna, 2006, 47). As of 2000, about 7,500 new clinical projects
were being designed for research and development worldwide, a number that had grown to 10,000 by
        
 
   
    
    
   
     
     
   
    
   
       
  
    
     
   
  
    
  
     
     
     
      
   
   
      
 
    
     
      
    
  
    
    
  
   
   
 
  
   
2001 (Petryna, 2006, 36). With some of these trials enrolling 10,000 people or more, the global scope of
human subjects research becomes quickly apparent.
As mentioned earlier, it is this change in the practice of biomedical research—this transformation in the
scope and scale of the sheer number of human persons subject to research from Willowbrook to
Trovan—that serves as the inciting force of this alternative narrative. The numbers are so vast, yet they
are so invisible, both to bioethics and to the general public. Millions of bodies are marshaled in the
service of research, yet they are so silent and unobtrusive. They are, in Foucault's terms, “docile.”
Millions of bodies voluntarily participate in an orderly fashion in research protocols that do not for the
most part further their own ends.
In this essay, I will suggest that one of the main biopolitical functions of bioethics is the creation of 
docile bodies, in this case, for transnational research. I will not focus on the cases of Willowbrook and
Trovan; I open with them because they capture the two loci I will highlight in the following pages:
research in the United States and research abroad. In what I know will be a more suggestive than
conclusive analysis, I offer two examples of bioethics vis-à-vis transnational research that demonstrate
its mission to produce docile bodies for research. These two examples offer snapshots, as it were, of the 
contemporary conversation on research ethics, a punctilious sampling that might enable us to discern
whether a more systematic study is warranted.
The first is a discussion of research ethics in the United States from a recent issue of The American 
Journal of Bioethics. Here, in one of the central professional journals of the discipline, nearly two dozen
leading bioethicists consider a novel proposal for rethinking research ethics. The second example draws
from the current conversation in bioethics on research ethics in and with resource-limited countries.
Here, I will argue, we see a novel dynamic of the new biopolitics: the creation of docile political bodies— 
docile States—States that will police themselves and who will, in turn, facilitate the production of docile
bodies for research. This development takes Foucault's work one-step beyond his own framework, but it
is a development consistent with his vision. Before proceeding to the two examples, let us turn briefly to
an overview of that vision of Foucault's notion of the disciplinary matrix of bioethics.
II. THE DISCIPLINARY MATRIX OF BIOPOLITICS12 
Michel Foucault was a prolific writer whose work spanned topics from medicine to sexuality over two
decades. Over this period, his critical framework continued to evolve. This section summarizes those
aspects of his work most pertinent to understanding bioethics as a mode of biopolitics, particularly his
account of the disciplinary matrix of institutionalized discursive practices and the complex interactions
between bodies, power, discourses, practices, institutions, and truth.
The focal point of Foucault's analyses—be it of the clinic, the asylum, or the prison—is the material 
reality of bodies. Foucault is particularly interested in mapping the ways in which bodies within a
particular social space are organized and “produced”—shaped, that is, to perceive and behave in
particular ways. These mechanisms of organization and production by larger social forces are nothing
other than politics, and the organization and production of bodies for social ends is, therefore,
biopolitics.
Foucault relentlessly focuses on what happens to bodies, seeing them as the site on which power is
contested. Bodies have materiality; sociopolitical institutions do not, at least in the same way. They gain
     
     
  
     
     
     
   
    
  
   
     
  
  
   
 
  
      
   
     
   
  
  
 
    
    
  
    
   
    
  
    
     
  
 
   
 
    
   
their reality, their power, from the material reality of human embodiment.13 Social theorist Bryan Turner
summarizes Foucault's thesis: “The body as an object of power is produced in order to be controlled,
identified, and reproduced” (Turner, 1984, 34).
Power, for Foucault, is not negative per se; nor does it follow the binary code of much of liberal political
discourse, being either oppressive or liberatory. Rather, it is essentially productive. It is the means
whereby all things happen (Giddens, 1982, 219; Finkelstein, 1990, 14). But yet, it is not simply neutral.
Joanne Finkelstein captures Foucault's sense of the decentered, circulatory, web-like, nature of power:
Power is a strategy of relations that gives some individuals and groups the ability to act and
keep acting for their own advantage. Power is also the ability to bring about a desired situation
and to prevent the actions of those who would thwart such desires. (Finkelstein, 14)
Within a biopolitical regime, power will not most often be wielded in an overt, coercive manner. Ideally,
individuals come to wield it over themselves. Within a regime of disciplinary power, each person—by
internalizing the norms and surveillance of the social order—effectively disciplines herself or himself. As
such, this exercise of power can direct individuals to engage in actions that are not necessarily to their 
advantage. In short, the basic goal of disciplinary power is to produce persons who are docile—persons,
in other words, who do not have to be externally policed.14 
But what are the mechanisms of “governmentality,” the means by which bodies become
docile?15 Foucault and others identify three necessary elements: discourses, practices, and institutions.
Discourses are bodies of concepts, literatures, that define and produce objects of knowledge, governing 
the ways a topic can be meaningfully talked about and reasoned about. Discourses make possible the
appearance of objects at particular historical moments and provide a language for talking about them.
Informed consent, for example, did not exist as a primary conceptual object prior to the Nuremberg
Code.
Discourses are also deeply allied to bodies. Social theorist Arthur Frank describes discourses as
Cognitive mappings of the body's possibilities and limitations, which bodies experience as
already there for their selfunderstanding …. These mappings form the normative parameters of 
how the body can understand itself …. Discourses only exist as they are instantiated in ongoing
practice or retained by actors as “memory traces”. (Frank, 1991, 42)
One example of such a discourse would be the modern scientific account of anatomy. Arising in part out
of the structures of the human body, it equally arranges, depicts, defines, and describes the way in
which inhabitants of Western culture literally “map” their bodies; bodies no longer consist of humors or
mime the structures of the heavens but instead are composed of organs, systems, tissues, cells, DNA,
and so on. Equally, the languages of disease and illness are discourses mapping bodies’ self-
understandings.
Dorothy Smith refers to discourses as “extralocal texts—texts created elsewhere—that organize action
and relationships in local settings by instructing actors in those settings as to what they should do and
perhaps proscribing what they cannot do” (Frank, 2001, 356). Frank elaborates on Smith's reading of 
discourse with the example of diagnostic-related group (DRGs):
  
   
     
  
      
  
  
  
  
   
  
   
    
     
    
   
 
      
  
   
  
   
    
   
  
 
  
  
    
   
    
   
  
 
 
    
     
   
   
      
     
   
In medicine, diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) … are a prime example of discourse …. DRGs are
written documents, created by a group of specialists working on the basis of individual clinical 
experience and aggregate data but working apart of any specific scene of clinical practice. These
specialists produce a code of diagnosis—all illness must map into DRG categories to be 
treated—and detailed specifications of what count as reimbursable services for each category.
DRGs, as a textual code created elsewhere, thus organize activity in local clinics. People in local 
settings still make decisions and deliver care, but the text limits and directs what they can do.
(Frank, 2001, 357)
A key feature of discourses, as this example suggests, is that the content of the “extralocal text” is
understood as technical or formal knowledge, knowledge that is increasingly esoteric, and the purview
of specialists and elite professionals.
Discourses, of course, do not simply float free. In order to create docile bodies, they must be incarnated
in social practices, in “techniques of discipline.” Discourses and practices stand in reciprocal relationship:
discourses define the rules for practices, which in turn enact those discourses vis-à-vis individual 
bodies.16 Through the creation of such bodies that then go on to act in the world in self-motivated ways,
practices further realize (make real) and reproduce the vision and commitments of the discourses in the
world.17 
Discourses are legitimated in part by being embedded in institutions, centralized social spaces that
provide spaciotemporal continuity for the punctilious enactments of discursive practices. In doing so,
they enable the exponential consolidation of productive power as well as a visible social sanction for the
claims put forward in a particular discourse. Further, institutions enable methods of surveillance crucial
for the mapping and normalizing of the bodies within their population. Institutionally sanctioned
discourses both define the “normal” and, through techniques and practices, encourage individuals to
regulate and achieve her or his own conformity with the established rules.18 Eventually, certain attitudes
and practices come to prevail as normal and acceptable. Institutionalization, therefore, has the effect of
rendering particular discourses “true”—for you can look around and see that they are telling the truth— 
and, via their ability to “predict” normalizing outcomes and to produce normal bodies, institutions
reinforce the “scientific” character of the discourse's growing body of knowledge.
Disciplinary matrices of discourses, techniques, and institutions are able to exercise power in this
decentralized manner insofar as the discourse is able to sustain a regime of truth. “Truth” in this sense
points to the creation of knowledge as a function of power. Truth is a product of discursive practices
understood to emerge only within a structure of rules, practices, and institutions that control the
discourse and collaborate to establish a given claim as true. Knowledge shaped by discourses,
empowered by institutions, and wielded through techniques and practices thus has the power to make 
itself true.
Truth then is embodied and reproduced through “rituals of truth,” practices shaped according to the
rules of the discourse which then, not surprisingly, reinforce the truth-claims of the discourse (one might
think, e.g., of the truth of the anthropological claim that we are autonomous individuals embodied and
reproduced through the practice of advance directives). Through these many factors, the networks of
productive power serve to produce, via bodies, particular styles of subjectivity. Under ordinary
circumstances, subjects are both produced within discourses and simultaneously subjected to
discourses. Such subject production is one component of the process of normalization.
       
    
    
   
      
  
  
         
    
      
    
   
   
     
       
  
 
  
   
    
 
      
  
   
      
 
   
 
    
   
 
    
     
 
   
  
   
  
   
    
 
To narrate bioethics as biopolitics will mean to attend to these elements within each of the variety of
subissues that make up the discipline. In this particular case, we would ask these questions and look for
these dynamics within the complex of transnational research. Where, we would ask, do we find the
materiality of human bodies being managed, organized, and produced in particular ways? In what ways
is power being exercised vis-à-vis these bodies––what strategy of relations can we identify? To whom
among the players in transnational research do these relations give the greater ability to act and to keep
acting for their own advantage? How do these strategies enable particular agents to bring about a
desired situation and to prevent the actions of others who would thwart such desires? In what ways
does the ethical discourse on transnational research forward the conceptual mapping of bodies and
actions that enable these strategies? In what practices, techniques, or rituals of truth is this discourse
embodied and by what institutions is it made the truth in new locations? How does the discourse do this
such that the bodies in question (and their attendant subjectivities) become docile, unaware that they
are being produced in particular ways and that they are acting toward others’ advantages more than
their own? And lastly, how does the rhetoric of the institutionalized discursive practices mask these
dynamics, rendering them apolitical, neutral, and objective? For a striking example, let us turn to The
American Journal of Bioethics.
III. CREATING DOCILE BODIES AT HOME
For Foucault, bodies are the site upon which power is contested; they are equally—as a sine qua non— 
the site upon which clinical research is conducted. At the center of biomedical research is the concrete,
material reality of human bodies. In, with, and through these bodies, power is produced and exercised,
not primarily by those who inhabit those bodies but by external agents—researchers, physicians,
biotech corporations, and national governments. As we have seen, the ability of biomedical research to
exercise this power has expanded extensively, particularly since the early 1980s, spreading web like
across the globe, encompassing ever greater numbers of human bodies. In this endeavor, the discipline
of bioethics has been and remains a key ally, assisting in the production, organization, and management
of these bodies.
Conventional wisdom tells a slightly different story. In the received narrative, a series of abuses of 
human subjects and patients over a 40-year period (1932–1972), often at the hand of U.S. government 
researchers, led to the founding of the President's Commission on the Protection of Human Subjects
(1974), which resulted in the publication of The Belmont Report in 1979. Bioethics thus stands as that
agent that corralled potentially dangerous and unregulated scientists, protecting citizens’ well-being and
autonomy while channeling the outcomes of biomedical research toward the common good.
Working with the same history, sociologist John Evans provides an alternative perspective on the
relationship between bioethics and biomedical research. In his book Playing God: Human Genetic 
Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate (2002)19, Evans helpfully debunks the
dominant myths that shape the recent “histories” of bioethics. His empirical study particularly
undermines those accounts that suggest that bioethics is primarily an open, public deliberative practice
which involves reasoning with other citizens or a limited set of procedural norms that facilitate the full 
range of individual value judgments. He challenges accounts that cast bioethics as necessitated by the
pluralistic nature of contemporary U.S. society or by expanding commitments to democracy as well as
stories that plot such developments as “natural” progressions.
     
   
   
   
  
  
     
 
 
   
   
    
  
   
     
  
    
  
    
   
    
     
  
   
     
  
    
 
  
    
    
   
    
   
    
    
  
    
    
   
Evans convincingly demonstrates that the growth and institutional embodiment of bioethics in the
United States, via government advisory commissions, took shape precisely as a way to circumvent
pluralism, to “avoid more direct democratic control” (73). As he demonstrates, the pluralist model of
democracy in fact threatened research; it was “unacceptable to the scientists, who feared that an
‘excitable’ public would shut down not only [human genetic engineering] research, but other research in
their home jurisdiction that the public did not understand” (36; see also 72 ff.). They were fearful, in
other words, of funding cuts (Evans, 76), pointing to the hidden substrate of political economy
underlying these discussions.
Bioethics, then, according to Evans's Weberian analysis, emerged not as a mechanism for augmenting
freedom or for promoting individual pursuit of self-defined goods and ends; rather, bioethics emerged
as a mechanism for shaping and controlling the hoi polloi so that the growing Leviathan of biomedical 
research could quietly continue to pursue its own ends behind the scenes. A first step toward such a
goal was to create a discourse and a set of practices—a body of esoteric, technical, and formal 
knowledge that would be portrayed as inaccessible to the common-person allied to acceptable
procedures for decision making housed in the institutional framework of IRBs. The first step, in other
words, was to create the new discipline of bioethics.
In more Foucauldian terms, Evans is arguing that one of the first functions and, perhaps, objectives of
bioethics—its originating raison d'etre—was to pacify an outraged and unruly public, transforming them
into bodies docile to the research industry. Many examples could be marshaled in support of this
argument beyond those included in Evans’ own analysis. For our purposes, I would like to highlight a
recent exemplar—an exchange on research ethics in The American Journal of Bioethics. Although only a
punctilious snapshot of the broad and ongoing conversation on the ethics of transnational research, it
captures in crystalline clarity the biopolitical essence of bioethics.
Here, in a Target Article, Rosamond Rhodes argues for the “Rethinking of Research Ethics” (Rhodes,
2005). Rhodes is concerned that “current research policies too often limit research,” especially with
regard to “vulnerable” populations (7). This concern for vulnerable populations she argues, “set
research ethics off in the wrong direction” (7). Consequently, one of the major problems with research
ethics is that “the rules give special weight to the protection of the vulnerable” (7). As she notes
Instead of focusing attention broadly on the development of reasonable boundaries for the
conduct of human subject research, policies have focused narrowly on the protection of human
subjects. Even the titles of oversight policies and agencies reflect this narrow aim. In the U.S.,
the regulations are called “Policy for the Protection of Human Research Subjects,” and the
agency for compliance was first the Office for the Protection from Research Risks (OPRR) and
now the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP). (7)
This focus on protection “wastes opportunities to gather evidence,” and she laments “the contortions
imposed on researchers” (9). Human subjects research has, since World War II, contributed to
A dramatic increase in biomedical knowledge and tremendous progress in creating effective
treatments …. We stand [she maintains] on the brink of a cascade of insights into human
genetics and the promise of spectacular related advances in biomedical technology …. Without
human subjects research, those treatments are less likely to be available. (15)
     
  
       
      
   
    
   
    
   
  
     
    
   
   
  
    
  
  
    
     
  
    
   
   
    
  
     
     
   
  
   
 
   
 
   
     
       
   
  
     
 
  
Therefore, such an “unjustified inhibition of research” is an “ethical catastrophe” (26). The engine of 
research must not be stopped.
In light of these problems, Rhodes puts forward what she names a “novel proposal,” one that “society
may not yet be ready to embrace” (23). As we saw earlier in Evans’ account of bioethics in the 1970s,
Rhodes remains concerned about an excitable public that does not fully understand the importance of
biomedical research or the complexities of moral reasoning, but she knows that her audience of fellow
bioethicists are professional experts with an “evolving understanding of the moral requirements for the
ethical conduct of research” (25). As such, bioethicists should be ready to “reexamine and reassess
reigning research dogmas” (25). She proposes a policy of national conscription for biomedical research,
a policy of “compulsory research participation” (23). Citizens would have no choice about whether to
participate in human subjects research; it would be a duty: “In the same way that we have endorsed
laws that require us to pay taxes and to serve on juries, reasonable people should accept an obligation
to periodic service as research subjects” (15). Otherwise, they are “taking advantage of the kindness of
others,” “being free-rider[s]” and hence being unreasonable and unjust (15). We each need to do our
part if we expect to utilize the benefits of medical knowledge.
To be specific, she suggests that “our legislature passes a bill that requires every U.S. resident [note: she
does not specify ‘citizen’] to perform some research service every ten years” (16). Even in matters
military, we understand the draft to be “selective service,” but not so for Rhodes: from this policy, no
one would be exempt, including those without decisional capacity: “Just as other laws apply to those
who cannot consent to them, there is no obvious reason why a research participation policy should be
different. No group should be exempt from research participation” (17). Of course, autonomy would not
be jettisoned. All research participants would have the freedom to choose which protocol they would
participate in. Thus, informed consent and autonomy remain respected.
One could not invent a more fitting exemplar of bioethics as biopolitics in action. Rhodes’ proposal is, in
essence, a proposal for the wholesale reorganization of the production and management of the bodies
of U.S. residents for research. Rhodes’ proposal, if incarnated, would increase the number of persons
subject to research in the United States from approximately 2.3 million as noted above, to
approximately 35 million per year. This would be a stunning mobilization of human embodiment. It also
aims not simply at increasing the number of subjected bodies but as “increasingly ordering” all sectors
of the U.S. population, particularly those currently considered vulnerable and therefore protected.
Those vulnerable bodies remain unruly—wild and untamed—from the perspective of biopolitics. The
vehicle for this shift is the eminently reasonable discourse of bioethics—sufficiently abstract and
philosophically esoteric to be largely inaccessible to those whose bodies are under consideration— 
which is challenged to support a new practice (conscription) embodied in the institutional forms of 
government and IRB. The professed justification for this radical shift is the improvement of the welfare
of the U.S. population (i.e., the common good) as well as the enhancement of the freedom of members
of vulnerable groups. The effect, of course, would be to systematically and enormously enhance the
power of the transnational research industry.
Rhodes’ proposal was joined in conversation by seventeen respondents in the pages of The American 
Journal of Bioethics, many of whom, like Rhodes, are leading figures in the discipline of bioethics.20 Not
all addressed her proposal for conscription. Most found her arguments throughout deeply flawed. Yet
by and large, the respondents applauded her proposal as innovative, reformative, provocative,
    
    
     
       
  
      
  
   
  
    
    
    
    
      
 
     
     
   
     
  
     
  
    
    
   
      
  
   
 
    
    
  
    
  
    
 
    
      
    
  
    
controversial, courageous, challenging the status quo, and so forth. And almost to a scholar, they are
“sympathetic” with her fundamental concern, namely, the way to “engender widespread social support
for research as a means of serving the common good” (London, 2005a, 37). As Gavin Hougham notes,
Rhodes is not the first to raise concerns about the “unjustified limits on research” (36). Similarly,
Howard Trachtman, although rejecting her proposal for universal conscription agrees that we should
“compare clinical research to military service [but] in a more expansive manner and view it as national 
health defense” (2005, W22).
In short––the rhetoric of freedom, public discussion of goods, protecting and advancing pluralism, and
being simply about procedures rather than goods notwithstanding––it is clear that the mainstream
discipline of bioethics has decided in advance what the good is: as full and active participation by the
masses in the ritual practices of biomedical research for the good of society as possible. As in the 1970s,
bioethics appears to remain solidly in the employ of the biomedical research establishment: research
cannot be hindered; therefore, the task of bioethics is to figure out how to get the masses to agree; and
if not, to conscript them to submit their bodies to the biotech industry, while believing that in doing so,
they are autonomously choosing their own ends.
Here, with unprecedented transparency, the organization of bodies for research becomes complete. No
body escapes, no matter how vulnerable. Resistance and avoidance are no longer possible; all become
docile, offering their bodies for the good of the political economy of biotech research. Although Rhodes
argues that such conscription advances the interests of each participant, insofar as they or their family
members might benefit from the therapeutic fruits of clinical research, it is clear that the immediate and
primary beneficiaries will be the agents and institutions conducting the research and making the profits.
Here bioethics serves to develop a strategy of relations, a practice, a technique of discipline
(conscription), authorized by an institution (federal policy) that will advance the interest of the biotech
industry and remove or mitigate those obstacles (difficulties of subject recruitment and national 
guidelines for the protection of human subjects) that thwart their objectives. Those bodies that might
balk at such a blatant move toward production and control are consoled with the fig leaf of autonomous
choice; everyone can choose their poison, their protocol. And over time, as those raised under the old
regime that understood research participation as an altruistic action of those who sought to give the gift
of their participation for the common good die out and the young are raised under the new regime of 
conscription, universal research service will be understood as the norm, as what everyone does, as what
has always been done, for the common good. It will have attained the status of truth.
IV. CREATING DOCILE BODIES ABROAD
If the discipline of bioethics exercises a biopolitical function in the United States, assisting in the creation
of docile bodies for research, it is likely that it exercises a similar function with regard to the bodies of 
populations beyond our own shores. Such a case could certainly be made, for the literature in bioethics
on research conducted by first-world agencies on human subjects in developing or resource-limited
contexts continues to grow, providing much evidence for this claim. For our purposes, however, I will
focus on one particular aspect of this particular literature, as I believe it provides evidence not only of 
bioethics as biopolitics but also of a potentially new development within Foucault's own framework.
Foucault traces the development of the institutions of disciplinary power during the era of the creation
and consolidation of the modern nation-state. His account of institutionalized discursive practices
      
  
    
  
     
   
   
 
  
  
   
  
     
   
 
 
    
    
   
   
    
  
      
       
   
    
     
  
  
    
    
    
   
   
    
  
   
    
     
  
   
     
demonstrates the ways in which such practices mobilize the bodies of citizens to solidify the power of
the state. In the contemporary moment, the nature and future of the nation-state is in flux. Only half a 
century post-colonialism, many states are still “emerging,” trying to craft identities out of arbitrarily
rendered geopolitical boundaries. Globalization and neoliberal economics have rendered many
transnational corporations larger (economically) than many countries and by their very nature “beyond”
national jurisdiction. Consequently, it could be argued that biopolitics now aims to reproduce a different
social order than the state. Given the new political economy of globalization, one could argue that,
although states remain proximate ends of disciplinary power, a new agent and end of disciplinary power 
are transnational corporate entities and that individual states now serve as intermediary agents of this
power-mobilizing bodies in service of a transnational social order.
Fully establishing such a claim is beyond the scope of this paper, but the literature of bioethics on
research in developing contexts provides a provocative piece of evidence. As we saw with the American 
Journal of Bioethics discussion, the discipline of bioethics seeks to produce persons who are docile vis-à-
vis the research establishment; as such, research ethics is clearly an exercise of power to direct
individuals to engage in actions that are not necessarily to their advantage. Beyond the developed
world, however, lies chaos. If vulnerable populations in the United States represent pockets of unruly or
untamed bodies from the perspective of first-world researchers, the bodies of persons in resource-
limited contexts are a new frontier. How to access and incorporate those bodies into the network of
transnational research remains an ongoing challenge, especially when much of this management must
be done from a significant geographical distance. A solution to this challenge appears to lie in the
creation of docile corporate bodies––docile States—that will police themselves vis-à-vis research ethics,
and who will, in turn, facilitate the production of docile human bodies for research.
Most of the literature on the conduct of research in developing contexts follows the standard narrative.
The framework for the debate was set in 1988 in two early essays on HIV/AIDs trials in Africa by
Nicholas Christakis (1988) and Michele Barry (1988). Barry methodically analyzes HIV/AIDS trials via the
subheads of autonomy and informed consent, nonmaleficence and beneficence, and justice with
additional commentary on the state of review committees in developing countries. Christakis, after
introductory remarks on scientific appropriateness of study populations, structures his analysis within
the canon of risk–consent and beneficence.
Subsequent analysis follows this map. Bioethicists tackle challenges presented by developing world
contexts to the practice of informed consent, particularly non-Western anthropologies, lack of the
concept of choice, lack of basic literacies (cultural, scientific, or otherwise), and alternative notions of
the relationships between person and community.21 Equally, the literature engages questions of
nonmaleficence and beneficence, including not only risk–benefit calculus of immediate and long-term
physiological and health ramifications of particular interventions for specific research subjects but
equally the kinds and limits of benefits that can enter into the moral calculus as well as questions of who
is the proper recipient of benefit—the research subjects, their local community, their country, or some
combination thereof.22 Not surprisingly, in considerations of the ethics of transnational research, the
debate around beneficence quickly elides into considerations of the principle of justice.23 Most
commentators continue to work with a relatively narrow sense of justice as fairness, where fairness
concerns the just distribution of the burdens and benefits of the research (Barry, 1988, 1084–5). 
Particularly contested is the distinction between “reasonable availability” of benefits versus a more
limited notion of “fair benefits.”24 It also includes the controversy over standards of care utilized in
   
 
    
  
   
    
      
  
  
    
    
      
   
    
  
      
 
     
  
   
    
    
   
      
    
     
  
   
  
    
 
   
  
   
  
   
     
   
       
  
research design.25 This focus on justice stems from a recognition of the power differential and
socioeconomic gap between researchers from rich countries and researchers from poor countries; but it
is only recently that the conversation has begun to frame the issue as one not primarily of distributive
justice but of social justice.26 
Beyond the four canonical principles, two additional questions animate this literature. The first, that I
will only mention briefly, concerns the ongoing controversy over whether the ethical standards applied
when research is conducted by investigators of one country on subjects of another should be
internationally universal or context specific. Marcia Angell (1988), for example, argues against ethical 
relativism, contending that such context specificity with regard to scientific standards would be ruled
out of court. If scientific standards are considered absolute, why ought ethical standards be less
rigorous? McMillan and Conlon, alternatively, take the opposite position and do so in a particularly
illuminating way. Referring to the principle that therapies derived from human subjects research ought
to be made “reasonably available” to participant subjects, they argue
Sticking strictly to this principle would stop a significant amount of research …. The problem is
that the Helsinki recommendation is strongly worded and if a treatment is for a chronic illness
the cost of having to supply treatment to research participants on an indefinite basis may mean
that valuable developing world research is not conducted. (205–6)
Here, as with the American Journal of Bioethics conversation and the forebears of bioethics, the expert 
discourse presumes transnational biomedical research to be an unquestioned good. Insofar as it
contributes to the common good, the collective wealth of scientific knowledge and medical treatment, it
is increasingly construed as a benefit to which underserved people and populations have a right. As
before, behind the rhetoric of autonomy, benefit, and justice lies a commitment that the machinery of 
the research industry must not be slowed.
The main mechanism for advancing this commitment comprises a final focus of this bioethics literature,
namely, the need to establish ethics mechanisms in developing, resource-limited countries.27 A common
lament focuses on “the absence and ineffectiveness of ethics review committees in many developing
countries” (Anya, 2003) and calls for the enhancing of IRB capacity as well as developing clinical trial 
capacity in the countries where the research takes place.28 Although even local guidelines may have
been crafted, many developing countries lack sufficient bureaucratic infrastructure to implement and
regulate them, much less to oversee foreign researchers. A main task of bioethics and transnational 
research is to create an ethics infrastructure.
Here the biopolitical disciplinary matrix of transnational research ethics becomes clear. Discourses,
practices, and institutions come together in a seamless package, whose aim is to reproduce a regime of
truth in a new location. Recall Dorothy Smith's notion of discourses as extralocal texts establishing ruling
relations through specific practices institutionalized in specific institutional authorities. The change in
“geography” in the move from Belmont to Beauchamp and Childress, from the laboratory to the clinic,
or from the DRG specialist to clinical practice was relatively subtle. That a “text created elsewhere” was
“organiz[ing] action and relationships in local settings by instructing actors in those settings as to what
they should do and perhaps proscribing what they cannot do” was easy to miss since the external and
local agent share a cultural context.
   
  
     
 
   
 
     
     
    
    
   
   
 
   
  
 
     
   
  
  
   
 
   
 
      
     
    
   
  
   
    
   
     
 
 
   
     
  
  
  
   
Such a change in geography is less subtle in the world of transnational research. Here the principles of 
bioethics, incarnate in the U.S. and international guidelines, function explicitly as extralocal texts. A
significant portion of the literature on the ethics of transnational research focuses on steps taken by
Western researchers to develop the infrastructure and capacity for ethical oversight in developing 
countries, the institutions and practices by which these extralocal texts will come to function in an
indigenous fashion.
Two examples among many illustrate this initiative. McIntosh et al. provide a detailed overview of the
first 18 months of a 5-year National Institutes of Health (NIH)-funded project that was “dedicated to
building a sound administrative infrastructure to meet both US and [Dominican Republic] IRB/IEC
requirements to assure proper review and oversight of the research study” (418):
In the current study US and DR teams jointly conducted bioethical training for all DR-based
project staff that would meet both US and DR requirements, and would also help build ethically
sound capacity for tobacco control research in the DR. This training included: (1) the Spanish
version Belmont Report with exam; (2) a bioethics course provided by the University or
Rochester's IRB (completed by both the US and DR project investigator teams) and (3) in-country
training. (418)
Similarly, Lescano et al. (2008) detail steps taken by the U.S. Naval Medical Research Center Detachment
(NMRCD) to create an IRB and attendant infrastructure in Venezuela in 2006. Not only does the NMRCD
take the Venezuelans through a step-by-step development and education process, it has subsequently
“maintained close ties, serving in an advisory and mentoring capacity as problems and questions arise”
(Lescano et al. 2008, 976). As they note
Training in research bioethics is essential for developing general expertise in the scientific
community, and in this case, NMRCD has been instrumental in engaging our Latin American
collaborators in the IRB enterprise …. In addition to their regular Webcast courses, the National 
Institutes of Health bioethics team has visited Peru and provided courses in Lima and other
cities in Peru since 2005, for the benefit of >500 participants from 13 countries. (977)
In other words, although test balloons of conscription into research service are being floated toward the
end of increasing the docility of the bodies of in the U.S. vis-à-vis biotech research, the same bioethics
establishment recognizes that a necessary prior step in transnational research is to increase the docility
of states, countries, and populations. Such docile political bodies must be created on the way to creating
docile bodies for human subjects research within their jurisdiction. Transnational research ethics is
equally about remaking the governments of those countries in our own image in order to produce a 
docility not only of the bodies of individual citizens of countries in the developing world but also of those
countries themselves.
That corporate agents are a target is indicated additionally by a unique dimension of the transnational 
research ethics literature, namely, its attention to communities as agents (Participants in the 2001
Conference on Ethical Aspects of Research in Developing Countries, 2004, 18). As mentioned above, in
transnational research ethics, the risk–benefit determinations and the interpretation of beneficence do
not apply solely to individual research subjects, as is the almost inviolate norm in the United States.
Here, communities, populations, or countries are treated as agents. In a significant innovation in
research ethics, these corporate bodies are equally deemed the subjects of risks and benefits; they are
  
   
  
   
     
   
   
  
      
 
    
   
     
     
  
   
 
     
  
   
   
     
     
  
     
  
   
    
     
     
    
  
    
    
   
     
     
     
    
   
    
the agents of consent. In the case cited at the outset of this essay, for example, Pfizer casts the 
government in the role traditionally assumed by the human subject: “Pfizer denies any wrongdoing. ‘We
continue to maintain—in the strongest terms—that the Nigerian government was fully informed in
advance of the clinical study ….” (Willyard, 2007, 763)
This concerted effort (funded frequently by the U.S. military or the National Institutes of Health) to
ensure the establishment of institutionalized bodies that will enact the discourse of bioethics via 
practices and techniques such as protocol review and informed consent demonstrates the coextensive
nature of discourses, practices, and institutions. As ethics organs are established in each locale, the
panoptic grid grows. More and more countries, and thus more and more bodies, come into the official 
and efficient gaze of biotech research, which can now legitimately extend its power through the 
materiality of human embodiment. In this way, the discipline of bioethics strategically creates and
extends a network of relations that gives transnational biotech research the ability to act and keep
acting for its own advantage, to bring about the desired situation of more and more research and more
and more profits, and to neutralize those who would thwart such desires. Under the rhetoric of
apolitical neutrality and objectivity, bioethics produces particular kinds of embodied subject–citizens
that enable the transnational biotech industry to effectively and covertly wield productive power.
V. CONCLUSION
We have before us, then, two examples from the contemporary conversation on transnational research.
As in the 1970s, so it is in the new millennium. Bioethics has determined the ends to be chosen—the 
“good” of biomedical research—and has determined that this is a primary end to be pursued, whether
in the U.S. or in developing contexts. This primary good of research has been decided absent an open,
public deliberative process by which the citizens of the particular countries in question might identify,
prioritize, and choose which goods they deem central to their flourishing as individuals, communities,
and nations. This commitment is particularly striking with regard to resource-limited contexts; where 
most of the population lacks clean water, sanitation, sufficient food, education, and adequate housing,
bioethics has staked a firm commitment to pharmaceutical and biotech research as a primary good— 
perhaps the primary good—to be instantiated. Moreover, it is clear that in the U.S. context we have
become sufficiently docile such that Rhodes’ (2005) proposal is not rejected as beyond the pale.
It is my hope that these two examples—the conversation on rethinking research ethics from The
American Journal of Bioethics and the commitment to advancing ethics mechanisms in resource-limited
contexts—are sufficient to suggest that the narrative of biopolitics is a plausible and perhaps a more
compelling framework for understanding the function and role of bioethics as it has evolved from the
end of the twentieth century in the United States to its more globally expansive role in the new
millennium. Certainly, these two examples cannot be more than suggestive, but I hope they are 
sufficient to invite further exploration into the biopolitical character of research ethics.
Illuminating the biopolitical nature of research ethics is, in fact, critically important to coming to a more
accurate and adequate account of bioethics itself. For, as those attuned to history know, the discipline
of bioethics is grounded in research ethics. The fundamental groundwork of bioethics was hammered
out in the debates around the practice of research. Subsequently, in an almost seamless shift, the
principles of research ethics articulated in The Belmont Report became transferred to the clinical
context in Beauchamp and Childress’ Principles of Biomedical Ethics. In other words, prior to reaching
   
       
  
     
  
  
   
    
   
    
    
      
     
    
   
   
     
  
 
 
    
   
     
   
     
     
   
   
  
   
 
     
  
    
    
     
   
  
   
    
   
across international boundaries to function as extralocal texts in resource-limited contexts, once the 
Belmont principles were established, bioethicists began to apply them and their form of argumentation
beyond their original focus in the ethics of human experimentation (Evans, 89–90).29 As David Rothman
notes, “the new rules for the laboratory permeated the examining room … the doctor-patient 
relationship was modeled on the form of the researcher-subject; in therapy, as in experimentation,
formal and informal mechanisms of control and a new language of patients’ rights assumed
unprecedented importance” (Evans, 91).
Thus, developments in research ethics retain a critical function vis-à-vis bioethics as a whole. Equally,
coming to see the biopolitical dimensions of the ethics of transnational research will facilitate our ability
to see how bioethics functions as biopolitics elsewhere. And this is the central question: What is the 
function of bioethics? What is the role of bioethics in the new political economy of medicine? Is the
discipline honest about its relationship to individual freedom and its neutrality regarding the good?
Attending to bodies, I believe, is the first and most crucial step in answering that question. Focusing on
what happens to the material reality of bodies—and refusing to let our analytic focus shift from those
bodies—will indicate whether the rhetoric of freedom and autonomy is sustainable or whether bioethics
is in fact yet one more discipline that utilizes strategies of surveillance and control, under appeals to the
welfare of individuals and populations, while serving to create docile bodies, bodies both individual and
corporate, that will cooperate with the industry of biotech research in ways that do not necessarily
further their own good or the good of their citizens, toward reproducing now a transnational economic
order.
Notes
1 Those familiar with the work of Michel Foucault will recognize the debt of this introduction to
the opening of Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1995). The following account of the hepatitis
experiments at Willowbrook is drawn primarily from The Advisory Committee on the Human
Radiation Experiments, 1996, 101–2 and Krugman (1986).
2 A Web site of the Frederick L. Erhman Medical Library hosts a biography of Krugman noting his
many accolades and making no mention of the concerns raised by the Willowbrook
experiments: http://archives.med.nyu.edu/exhibits/krugman/index.html (Accessed May 2,
2009). Krugman himself continued to defend the ethics of his experiments at Willowbrook until
the end of his life (Krugman, 1986).
3 The following account of the Pfizer/Trovan case is drawn primarily from Lewin (2001) unless
otherwise noted.
4 Deal in Pfizer-Nigerian Drug Suit (BBC, April 3, 2009). Available:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7982236.stm. (Accessed April 8, 2009).
5 Per Pfizer spokesperson, “We continue to maintain—in the strongest terms—that the Nigerian
government was fully informed in advance of the clinical study; that the study was conducted
appropriately, ethically, and with the best interests of patients in mind; and that it helped save
lives” (Willyard, 2007, 763). Pfizer does not state whether this lower mortality rate compares to
those children treated with chloramphenicol or those children throughout Nigeria who were
unable to receive treatment—effectively, a default placebo control group.
6 Press release, “Pfizer Becomes The First Pharmaceutical Company To Be Accredited For
Protection Of Human Rights In Clinical Research,” April 3, 2009. Available:
  
 
   
 
     
 
   
  
     
    
     
    
   
     
   
  
   
   
     
   
    
     
   
   
     
  
 
   
 
 
      
    
     
      
   
   
    
 
     
      
   
    
http://www.pfizer.com/news/press_”releases/pfizer_press_releases.jsp?rssUrl=http://mediaro 
om.pfizer.com/portal/site/pfizer/index.jsp?ndmViewId=news_view&ndmConfigId=1016273&n 
ewsId=20090403005547&newsLang=en (Accessed April 8, 2009). This accreditation came from
the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs and was
awarded for its conduct of Phase 1 trials in its clinical research units in New Haven,
Connecticut, Brussels, Belgium, and Singapore. Note: this accreditation is only for Phase I trials
and only for locations that would not generally be described as “resource limited” or 
“developing.”
7 In 1999, Trovan was discovered to cause liver damage and its use was curtailed by the Food
and Drug Administration. It was never approved for use in children (Lewin, 2001).
8 In this paper I use the term “transnational” research rather than “international” research. The
term international has connotations of mutuality, conjuring images like that of the United
Nations where agents meet on equal footing in largely democratic interactions. The term
transnational more accurately captures the political economy operative in much of the
research currently being conducted both in the U.S. and other developed contexts as well as in
resource-limited or developing contexts (which could also be embedded within national
contexts not similarly defined). The primary agents of much of the research conducted in the
United States or abroad are transnational corporations—primarily pharmaceutical companies
but biotechnology firms as well. Whether conducted by a transnational corporation or not, the
economic context of research is driven by the philosophy and practices adopted by
transnational corporations especially since 1980. Moreover, given the economic relationships
that have shaped much NIH and university-based research since the passing of Bayh-Dole in the 
early 1980s, the characterization of much non–corporate-based research could properly be
categorized as transnational. See Kim et al., 2000, 177–243 for further discussion of 
transnational corporations in general and in relation to health/health care in particular.
9 As illuminating as Foucault's work has proven in analyzing the social function of medicine, his
work has made few inroads into the literature of bioethics. Those who have brought Foucault's
work to bear on the discipline of bioethics include Finkelstein (1990); McKenny (1997); Shuman
(2003); Bishop and Jotterand (2006); Lysaught (2006); and Bishop (2008).
10 Global pharmaceutical market sales grew from an estimated $365 billion (U.S.) in 2000 to $712
billion in 2007. IMS Health, “Global Pharmaceutical Sales 2000–2007,” available:
http://www.imshealth.com. (Accessed April 10, 2008). The industry is highly profitable, posting 
profits of nearly 25% of sales in 1990; in 2001, the ten American drug companies in the Fortune
500 earned, as an industry, profits of 18.5% of sales in the same year that the median net
return for all other industries in the Fortune 500 (i.e., 490 other companies) was only 3.3% of 
sales. This was no fluke year; in 2002, Marcia Angell notes, “the combined profits for the ten
drug companies in the Fortune 500 ($35.9 billion) were more than the profits for all the other
490 businesses put together ($33.7 billion)” (Angell, 2004, 11).
11 In addition to corporations, an additional agent plays a significant role in most contemporary
research: the contract research organization (CRO). CROs comprise a for-profit industry
established in the early 1990s specifically to arrange human subjects research. For-profit
companies, they began listing and selling securities on public exchanges in the early 1990s. By
2001, there were roughly one thousand CROs globally with revenues of approximately $7
billion (Angell, 2004, 29; Petryna, 2006, 37–9).
   
    
  
   
     
   
   
   
   
  
  
   
    
  
    
    
     
     
   
    
  
    
   
   
     
 
    
  
   
       
     
  
     
  
  
    
   
  
    
     
   
   
      
12 The following section is modified from Lysaught 2006.
13 One of the most compelling accounts of this dynamic is provided by Scarry (1987).
14 Turner suggests that in order to preserve its boundaries and thus reproduce itself, a society
must negotiate four tasks: “The reproduction of populations in time, the regulation of bodies in
space, the restraint of the ‘interior’ body through disciplines, and the representation of the 
‘exterior’ body in social space” (2; see also 91). It would be fruitful to display the many ways in
which bioethics is involved with all four of these tasks.
15 Although Foucault uses the word “governmentality,” Dorothy Smith (1999) refers to the 
mechanisms that connect the local and extralocal with the intriguing phrase “ruling relations.”
Governmentality or “ruling relations” does not ascribe agency to a class or any specific
individuals, although some individuals and groups clearly benefit from a given system of ruling
relations. They are not, per se, intentional, nor directly under control of particular individuals or
groups. Rather, their power lies in that they are “pervasive and pervasively interconnected”
(Smith, 1999, 49). Ruling relations organize local settings through the medium of discourses
and are themselves the effects of that textual organization. Ruling relations make extralocal 
imperatives appear under such rubrics as rationality, efficiency, and perhaps most relevant to
social sciences, objectivity. Cited in Frank, 2001, 357.
16 As Arthur Frank notes, “Theory needs to apprehend the body as both medium and outcome of
social ‘body techniques,’ and society as both medium and outcome of the sum of these
techniques. Body techniques are socially given—individuals may improvise on them but rarely
make up any for themselves—but these techniques are only instantiated in their practical use
by bodies, on bodies. Moreover, these techniques are as much resources for bodies as they are 
constraints on them; constraints enable as much as they restrict …. People construct and use
their bodies, though they do not use them in conditions of their own choosing, and their
constructions are overlaid with ideologies” (1991, 48).
17 Bodies, of course, can equally resist, recreate, and transform discourses. My thanks to my
reviewer for this reminder.
18 “It is principally through discourse, that is, through the ways in which systems of knowledge are
established, expectations of human abilities discussed, and subjects and practices described in
the working literature of a professional group, that the ‘normal’ is defined” (Finkelstein, 15).
19 Evans provides one of the most interesting sociological accounts of bioethics. For those
interested in Foucault and bioethics, however, Evans’ account needs to be developed in three
ways. First, he needs to augment his Weberian reading of bioethics with Foucault, who does
not enter into his analysis. Second, possibly related to his reliance on Weber rather than
Foucault, Evans does not attend to the obvious relationships between the focus of his study
(the human genome project) and the management/production of human bodies, which is
evident even from his account. Third, although many of his findings point in this direction,
Evans does not display the importance of the relationship between the reconfiguration of 
bioethics and growth of the biotech industry—i.e., he does not attend to the connections
between science and the political economy underlying its growth, especially in the United
States, between 1970 and 1995. For example, he is concerned with the reduction of the four
principles/ends to one, that of autonomy. He finds this to be a threat to the internal logic of the 
profession of bioethics and therefore a threat to the profession itself. However, linking
bioethics to its economic substrate would clarify for Evans how the move to the single principle
  
  
     
    
     
   
  
 
   
    
    
   
    
   
  
 
   
 
   
     
   
  
      
  
   
  
        
 
   
  
       
   
   
   
  
 
   
   
 
    
      
 
of autonomy actually furthers the internal logic of bioethics, insofar as it is rooted in furthering
the economic ends of a state—and the biotech profession—committed to late capitalism: all 
becomes consumer choice directed toward the end of producing profit. Thus, the profession of
bioethics is not threatened by the reduction of all ends to autonomy; it will simply become the
profession that ensures that no other ends come into competition with that of autonomy, so as
to protect the unbridled operation of the marketplace within the realm of biotech research,
application, and health care. These critiques notwithstanding Evans analysis of bioethics is
quite compelling.
20 This number includes Robert Levine's opening editorial remarks and a subsequent response by
Howard Trachtman. Respondents include Ruth Macklin, Tom Beauchamp, Frank Miller, Gavin
Hougham, Alex J. London, Richard Sharp, Mark Yarborough, Havvi Morreim, Mary Simmerling,
Brian Schwegler, Jeanne Sears, Robert Wachbroit, David Wasserman, Fritz Allhoff, Jeffrey Spike,
Justin List, Luis Justo, Amy McGuire, and Laurence B. McCullough.
21 See, for example: Angell (1988), Christakis and Fox (1992), Macklin (2000), Farmer (2002), Pace
et al. (2005), Pace and Emanuel (2005), Newton and Appiah-Poku (2007), and Bento, Hardy,
and Osis (2008).
22 See, for example: Angell (1997), Angell (2000), Page (2002),Benatar (2001b),Mfutso-Bengo and
Muula (2007), Ballantyne (2008), and Grady et al. (2008).
23 See, for example: Benatar (2001a; 2001b) and Hawkins (2006).
24 See, for example: Arras (2004), Participants in the 2001 Conference on Ethical Aspects of 
Research in Developing Countries (2004), Pace et al. (2006), Benatar and Fleischer (2007),
Upshur et al. (2007) and London and Kimmelman (2008).
25 See, for example: Angell (1997), Lurie (1997, 1998, 1999a, 1999b), Lurie and Wolfe (1999),
Angell (2000), and McMillan, and Conlon (2004).
26 See, for example: Farmer (2002), London (2005a), and London (2005b).
27 See, for example: Anya (2003), Gilman and Garcia (2004), Lavery (2004), Lienhardt and Cook
(2005), Kennedy et al. (2006), White (2007), Lescano et al. (2008), McIntosh et al. (2008), and
Sewankambo and Ijsselmuiden (2008).
28 See also Lienhardt and Cook (2005), Benatar and Fleischer (2007), 621; Upshur et al. (2007),
Sewankambo and Ijsselmuiden (2008), and Di Tillio-Gonzalez and Fischbach (2008).
29 Evans, 2002, 90. For my own analysis of the shift in the form of the principles from Belmont to
Beauchamp and Childress, particularly the not-insignificant transformation of the principle of
“respect for persons” into the principle of “respect for autonomy,” and the relocation of 
vulnerable subjects and patients from the principle of respect for persons to the principle of 
beneficence, see Lysaught (2004).
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